Warfare at the PhD level

Posted February 19, 2010

Failure is usually easy to spot since mistakes are costly, painful, or at least embarrassing. Success, on the other hand, is easy to overlook. Noticing what works is important in business and in wartime — especially if the war is not going well.

I wrote earlier about the success of the 101st Airborne in Mosul, Iraq in the early days of the US invasion. Led by a commander who earned a PhD from Princeton based on his careful study of counterinsurgency in Vietnam, the Screaming Eagles tested risky, complex, and innovative counterinsurgency operations. Soldiers got out of their SUVs and walked to work — and died much more often as a result. They built clinics, roads, and schools and became trusted by local leaders. The experience in Mosul led directly to the Anbar Awakening, to rapprochement with large sections of the Sunni minority in Iraq, and to major promotions for the commander, General David Petraeus.

Patreus of course, now has responsibility for both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. He must smile a bit when he reads One Tribe at a Time, a war fighting strategy just released online by one of his Special Forces officers.

Major Jim Gant took a dozen Green Berets into an Afghanistan village, formed an unbelievably close relationship with the tribal leadership, ran the Taliban out and kept them out. Click the link above and read the article — it is smart, powerful stuff not unlike the initial thoughts a young David Patraeus was recording after his experience fighting in Vietnam.

Gant is no army dissident and he is no social worker either. As he notes,

"I and the men I have trained and fought with have won 20 awards for valor. Twenty. That is a truly remarkable number. I had a great ODA (Operational Detachment Alpha) 316 in Afghanistan as part of the 3rd Special Forces Group. We fought together for several years in Afghanistan. We fought in the Konar and Helmand Provinces in early 2003 and again 2004.

I then spent two years on a Special Projects team before returning to Iraq as the first American combat advisor for an Iraqi National Police Quick Reaction Force (QRF) battalion. Our mission was to kill and capture terrorists anywhere in the country. I won a Silver Star and the Iraqi National Police Medal of Honor while fighting alongside my Iraqi brothers in 2006 and 2007 when Iraq was the most dangerous place on earth."

Gant repeatedly asserts something that we know but still overlook: Afghanistan is a land of tribes, not nation of citizens. This is fundamental. Although the west has been growing more democratic since the Athenians in 500 BC, much of the rest of the world is either tribal (pick your pre-industrial country) or emerging from tribalism (many industrializing Middle East or African countries).

I dislike tribes, but I acknowledge that humans are wired for tribal behavior because tribes got us through several millennium when mammals as hairless, clumsy, and tasty as our forbears should have perished.

Gant knows that citizens and tribal members are not remotely the same thing. Citizens value adherence to common law; tribes value adherence to tribal authority. Citizens value freedom of choice; tribes value conformity to tradition. Citizens value gender and racial equality; tribes are patriarchal and ethnocentric. Citizens value education and criticism; tribes value fundamentalist religions that reinforce tribal beliefs. Citizens value initiative, innovation, and technology; tribes value personal honor, battlefield courage, and sacrifice for the tribe. Naturally, many citizens romanticize tribes and most tribes fear the rise of citizens.

Gant's account does a succinct and moving job of describing his approach, which is grounded in his understanding of Pashtunwali — the ethic of the Pashtun tribesman.

"This plan requires a small group of men who can comprehend the extensive networks, influences and idiosyncrasies of the mission and the environment.We’re talking about “street smarts”—the instinct to grasp and account for all second, third and fourth order effects of decisions at all levels.

"This is warfare at the Ph.D. level. It is constantly changing and requires continual assessment. Only a few dedicated men can execute this plan properly.

"It will become a very personal fight. Once we commit to the tribe, the Pashtunwali code comes into effect for the US team as well. In the end it will be the Tribal Engagement Team’s ability to build a true bond with the tribe that is backed up by warrior ethos: the ability and desire to fight and die alongside them when necessary."

Stephen Pressfield, a researcher who visits Afghanistan frequently, published Gant's account in his blog War & Reality in Afghanistan (the blog now carries a huge subhead: "It's the Tribes, Stupid" and an excellent video blog on tribal culture). He appeared with Jim Gant at a conference recently, just before Gant deployed back to Afghanistan. He reports:

""Midway through each speech, Maj. Gant started recruiting. He started firing up the troops. His eyes got big and the veins popped out on his neck. “You gotta be great! You have to be great every day or you’re dead and so am I. Don’t lie. Don’t ever lie, because they [the Afghan tribesmen] will see right through you. They know you better than you know yourself. If you promise something, deliver—because if you don’t you will lose everything including your life.”

"Maj. Gant’s mission wasn’t to enlist anybody. The Tribal Engagement program isn’t even in place yet. But he couldn’t help himself.

“I want three years from you. That’s your commitment. Not seven months, not twelve months. I’ll send you home for thirty days a year and then you’re back with me in the shit.

"It won’t surprise you, I’m sure, to hear that, each day, as soon as Maj. Gant finished, he was swamped by Marines and midshipmen. “I’m in, Major.” Sign me up, sir!” At night, when he got home to his quarters, his inbox was overflowing with e-mail addresses. “Take me, sir.” “Here’s where you can reach me.”

Gant is obviously a talented and committed warrior. His thought-provoking essay is in direct contrast to the whining, ugly column by a mysterious defense contractor in yesterday's NYT complaining that restricting air power over fear of civilian casualties would cost us the ability to win the Afghan war.

If we get out of Afghanistan with anything like our integrity intact, it will be because among our citizens are tribal warriors like Gant who learned how to build trust-based relationships with their tribal warriors. And loved doing it.