How Amazon Can Compete with Apple

Kindle-ipadAt the moment, Amazon's best selling Kindle is the king of the eBook readers. But the impending launch of Apple's iPad means that unless Amazon changes its direction and its mindset, the Kindle is kindling

Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos has a tough habit to break. It started when he built the Kindle and he deliberately copied Apple's approach to the iPod.

Publishers howled. But Bezos stuck to his guns and refused to compromise, just as Jobs had done. Bezos even made the same arguments to publishers that Jobs did to labels:  "you will make more money this way because we will sell more units". 

So when Steve Jobs decided to sell eBooks, he tossed his old play book. Instead, he offered publishers something that they had long been unable to bargain from Amazon: agency model pricing

This is worth understanding. The key question for publishers is who sets the retail price of the product. Traditionally a publisher suggests a list price but the actual retail price is set by the retailer. A retailer is free to mark products down according to their strategy and in the book market, large discounters like Walmart and Costco as well as virtually all websites sell books at a discount to the list price suggested by publishers. Amazon has always treated best-selling print books as loss leaders and today sells virtually all e-Books below cost.

But in an agency model, Amazon and Apple are not retailers -- they are agents of the publisher, who dictates the retail price and pays them an "agency fee" (a commission). Amazon has successfully resisted pressure to allow agency model pricing for the past two years. 

A table clarifies just how odd this is. This table illustrates (imperfectly because some costs are essentially fixed) the variable economics of a newly published mid list hardback trade book.  The economics of best-sellers, backlisted books, paperbacks, and textbooks are materially different but the conclusions are not. 


Printed Book 

eBook, retail 

eBook, agency pricing 

Publisher's List Price$25.99$12.99$12.99
Edit, market, author royalties (1)5.703.004.00
Typeset, print, store, return (2)4.0000
Wholesale price (3)13.0013.009.09
Retail price17.999.9912.99
Gross profit to retailer   4.99-3.003.90
Gross profit to publisher3.3010.005.09

Notes
: (1) Editing and marketing $1 each -- fixed costs that diminish with volume. Author royalties shown at 15% of list price -- it can be less -- or for franchise authors, a lot more. (2) Varies because of returns. Best sellers have very low unit costs here because returns are low and print runs are high, but 99% of all books are not best sellers. (3) 50% of publisher's list price for ebooks or print books. 70% for agency model sales. See today's NYT for a similar take.

What the heck is going on here? 

  • Why is Amazon is fighting publishers for the right to lose $3 per eBook? Amazon wants to sell ebooks below cost in order to shift consumers to electronic books. In eBooks, Amazon has a lot more market power -- especially if they control the leading device. Not for nothing has the Kindle spent almost two years on Amazon's incredibly valuable home page. 
  • Why do publishers favor higher retail prices when they sell fewer units and earn less on each unit sold? Publishers, on the other hand, fear that eBook sales cannibalize print sales and threaten their core business model. When eBooks cost consumers half what print books cost, customers switch to them in large numbers -- especially heavy readers. If Amazon can convert heavy readers to eBooks, publishers know that the remaining market will not support brick and mortar retail outside of major cities. Which would give Amazon the power to force wholesale prices lower. Publishers may make more money on eBooks than print books now (although most claim that they do not), but over time eBooks sales are likely to be very concentrated among a few online players -- putting even more pressure on publisher's prices.
  • Why do publishers charge retailers the same for eBooks and print books? They are pricing eBooks based on the cost of print books, not against underlying costs. They can do this in part because early adopters are a bit less price sensitive, but it is a short term approach. Publishers know that the price of printed books cannot fall much lower, but eBook prices have a lot of room to fall. Which means that Amazon will continue to try to force prices lower. This is harder with agency model pricing, but it is quite possible. 


What is Apple trying to do?

Kindle_2aNewsWeek1Apple is a company built on 40% operating margins. Why would it want to enter the notoriously competitive book retailing business? It doesn't. Long term, Apple wants to do more than sell electronic reproductions of printed books, although it is happy to do this short term, since publishers have guaranteed them a slice of each sale.

Agency pricing helps the eBook strategy because it means that Amazon (whose Kindle will run on the iPad) cannot underprice Apple. (Agency pricing also keeps Apple's margins up by allowing them to book as revenue only the commission, not the product). This new pricing structure gives Apple instant credibility with publishers, something they never had with record labels. 

But Apple does not want to simply sell books, they want to reinvent them. Armed with a Jesus tablet, Apple wants to create, control, and sell premium books. Textbooks would come with embedded videos, tutorials, study guides, sample tests, forums and tutoring services. Children's books would shake, rattle, and roll. Novels would include guides for reading groups, author interviews, alternative endings, suggested next books, film clips, sample chapters from the sequel, and dedicated social networks for fans. Science texts would contain myriad links, video demos, and discussion forums. Travel books would geo-locate and tie to restaurant and shopping recommendations, events, etc. Not incidentally, none of these things are possible on the Kindle.

This week Penguin demonstrated that publishers fully understand the potential of high quality tablets like the iPad. They know that the game is not simply getting rid of printing presses -- it is to explode what we think of as a book. The following video (produced within a month of the iPad's debut and well before its launch) gives you a glimpse of their thinking:

Penguin also predicted that eBooks will go from 4% to 10% of the book market in one year. Translation: books are precisely ten years behind music. The iPod was announced the week that the twin towers fell and in late 2001 music was sold overwhelmingly on CDs. The fastest growing music retailer was Amazon.

The book market is stagnant. It only grows most years because publishers raise prices, not because Americans buy more books. If eBooks replace printed books at the same rate that digital music replaced CDs, the number of printed books sold each year will decline at first 10%, then 20% and more annually. Publishers will be forced to limit returns from retailers (an appalling cost, but necessary for small retailers to afford high selection).

Brick and mortar bookstores will disappear at least as quickly as music retailers did. Chains like Borders and Barnes and Noble, long the bane of your local bookstore, will be out of the book business in five years. Investors understand this: they value Borders today at less than its break-up value. Amazon understands this as well: after all, they led the first revolution (when the iPod was released, Barnes and Noble was worth more than Amazon. Today, Amazon is 50 times more valuable than BN).

Amazon knows that once the iPad launches, the Kindle will start to look like the Garmin GPS, a dedicated device threatened by multifunction smart phones. The slow black and white Kindle will not fare well against a blazing color iPad. The contrast will be larger than a Mac vs a PC. Apple won't even have to run goofy commercials to make the point. 

Said another way, for the first time in its history, Amazon faces real competition for online book sales. Apple has sold 12 billion downloads to their base of 125 million customers -- and they did much of it from within iTunes, an vastly inferior retail experience to Amazon's. 

Amazon's response has been unusually clumsy. First, they decided to compete with publishers. Just before the iPad announcement, Amazon reached out to unpublished authors and announced that they would offer them 70% of the selling price of a book if they would publish directly to the Kindle. If publishers hated Amazon as an arrogant retailer, they hate them even more as a competing publisher

Second, Amazon announced that it is building an app store for the Kindle. An app store for a black and white device with a leisurely screen refresh rate? An app store for a device engineered to do only one thing? An app store for a device with no known SDK or programming language? Let me know how that works out. 

Kindle 3Finally, Amazon bought Touchco so that they can add a touch screen to a color Kindle. This is pathetic: Amazon, a brilliant retailer, is not going to produce a better piece of hardware than Sony, HTC, or Samsung and they sure aren't going to produce better hardware than Apple. I say this as a huge fan of Amazon and Jeff Bezos. He announced Amazon's results recently, and they grew revenue 42% over last year -- completely stunning performance by a great company. Their top selling product: the Kindle. 


How Should Amazon Respond? 

Amazon needs to stop copying Apple. They should realize that the value of the Kindle is as software, not hardware. If they need to copy anybody, start with their Seattle neighbors. Microsoft has out competed Apple for three decades. To take a page from their book, Amazon should:

  • Accelerate their e-book catalog, which is already at 400,000 books. Amazon is built on selection and books are the original long tail category. Scan books that are out of copyright or out of print. Help publishers digitize their backlist. Get to a million eBooks fast.
  • Incent specialty publishers to eschew print and ONLY publish electronically and with print on demand. Publish a few more best selling authors exclusively on the Kindle, as they did with Stephen King. 
  • Discount the Kindle to heavy readers even if it means pricing below current cost. Amazon needs to sell twice as many Kindles as iPads while other strategies mature. Consider giving Kindles away free to heavy readers.
  • Test $4.99 eBook pricing. Many publisher have backlist of titles that can sell at this price. According to the New York Times, O'Reilly sold "iPhone: the Missing Manual" as an eBook for $4.99. When they raised the price to $9.99, unit sales fell 75% (meaning that revenue fell in half). A mass market paperback is $6.99 -- why can't the eBook sell for $3.99 if there is no printer, no returns, and no distributor? Ultimately customers will decide optimal pricing -- but Amazon is the only retailer with the volume today to figure out what customers think is optimum.
  • Work with Adobe and Google to create open source digital media standards and tools. Amazon should help authors and publishers to produce premium books and media that are platform independent. Nobody is better at this than Adobe -- a company hated by Apple. Apple's decision not to support Flash for either the iPhone or the iPad is partly technical (Flash has issues) but partly emotional (Jobs has issues). Flash runs 95% of all web video and has a rich set of applications and developers not all of which will migrate easily to HTML 5. Amazon should incorporate Flash into an open standard and urge publishers to use it. 
  • Work with Google to open source the Kindle hardware. Amazon should work with Google now to grow retail sales of both Android and Chrome OS devices. They need to persuade Samsung, Acer, and Sony to offer competing tablets for both Android and Chrome OS platforms and persuade Google to get a Chrome OS SDK out soon. Amazon and Google and Adobe should promote an open source media development kit to prevent Apple from locking in publishers or content developers. Also open the carrier deals that Amazon has struck to dozens of devices. Amazon's future is selling books, not first generation proprietary devices. Repeat after me: the Kindle is software, not hardware.
  • Give away Touchco technology. If anyone wants it. Amazon cannot add value to this company and cannot beat the Apple by trying to imitate their vertically integrated approach to digital devices.
  • Maintain the Kindle application as open source. Build a phenomenal version of the Kindle app for the iPad and compete head to head with iBooks. Scream bloody murder to the FTC if Apple blocks or in any way restricts competing content on the iPad. Offer iPad users free Prime Accounts if they buy 50 eBooks a year. Continue to upgrade the iPhone, PC, and Mac versions of the Kindle software. Bring out a super attractive version for Android phones, Nokia and everyone else selling connected devices. Make sure that Kindle software comes installed on every netbook, knowing that Apple will never publish iBooks on a hardware or software platform that they do not control. 
  • Add movies and music to the Kindle. Amazon is a far better retailer than Apple is but they have not provided customers with a fully integrated solution. If Amazon exploits Apple's decision to walk away from DRM, it will eventually be able to sell movies and music to iPhones, iPods and iPads. Amazon can go after a significant fraction of iTunes revenues.  
In doing these things, Amazon can attack the source of Apple's biggest strength and their biggest blind spot -- namely, their deep vertical integration. Apple now makes its own chips, designs their own hardware, publishes their own operating system, controls all applications software, and even owns and runs all of the retail stores. Like Microsoft, Amazon can compete with Apple by unleashing an entire industry against them. 

Kindle2 This happened before. When Steve Jobs brought out the first commercially successful personal computer, he insisted on making all of the hardware and all the software for it. Microsoft enabled software to run on hardware made by others. Companies favored Microsoft, in part because they did not want to be dependent on Jobs.

Bill Gates inadvertently created an industry of hundreds of hardware and software companies. His system software was less elegant and his applications integrated less seamlessly with the hardware and operating system, but the Windows ecosystem adapted quickly enough and it outpaced Apple everywhere. Windows took 97% of the market and left Apple with a boutique 3%. Apple nearly died. 

Kindle software needs to run on dozens of general purpose devices. Some of these devices will be phones, some tablets, some netbooks, some desktops. Some will be fancy, some cheap, some specialized, some general purpose. They will focus on every demographic: tablets for teens with games and tablets for gramps with big buttons and big type. They will sell to every vertical: tablets for teachers, repairmen, and doctors. And every one of these devices should come with a Kindle reader tied to Amazon. 

Amazon does not win by copying Apple. Amazon wins by turning Apple's coolest features into commodities, just as Bill Gates did when he copied the Apple user interface again and again. Google and Adobe are Amazon's natural allies in this endeavor.

Amazon, Apple, Book Wars, Business, Competition, Economics, Technology, eCommerce

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